Interests and prices

The politics of inflation diagnosis at the Fed

Benjamin Braun

London School of Economics

Jérôme Deyris

Université Paris I

Monica DiLeo

Hertie School

Matthias Thiemann

Sciences Po

A quick self introduction

PhD on Green central banking

Postdoc on Central bank politics

Today’s presentation

Not a typical paper in history of economic thought

  • Central bankers are not (academic) economists but decide in scientized institutions (Goutsmedt et al., 2025; Marcussen, 2006)
    • Economic ideas, theories, policy principles, indicators everywhere in their decisions…
  • … which does not mean that they only act as “science based” neutral technocrats

We look at practitioners:

How central bankers read the macroeconomic situation, which theories they mobilize (often implicitly), and what else shapes that reading.

One project, two papers

Paper 1 — Interests and prices

  • To what factors do Fed officials attribute inflation to?
  • LLM assisted coding of all causal claims about inflation at the Fed since 1970
  • The wax and wane of theories of prices, and the strategic uses of economics by doves & hawks

Paper 2 — Fear of full employment

  • What explains the prominence of labor based explanations of inflation?
  • Formally test the role of economic fundamentals, forum and politics
  • Uncover a “fear of full employment” that is baseless, hidden in public speeches, and partisan

Motivation

What drives inflation?

Inflation is (relatively) easy to capture, but its causes lead to heated debates based on competing explanations

Controversies, even decades later!

An unavoidable question

Yet this question cannot be avoided by central bankers

  • Demand-side inflation: monetary policy must step in and raise rates
  • Supply-side inflation: central bankers can wait and see, as long as expectations stay anchored

No matter the actual drivers of inflation, their reading by central bankers will have material consequences!

Research questions:

  • How do central bankers understand the drivers of inflation to be?
  • How have their diagnosis evolved over time and across individuals?
  • Is their assesment driven by economic fundamentals? Or also by other institutional and political factors?

Agenda

  1. Literature: independence, scientization and the strategic use of ideas
  2. Data & method: detecting causal claims about inflation with LLMs
  3. Interests and prices: fifty years of inflation diagnosis at the Fed
  4. Fear of full employment: when does the Fed blame labor?
  5. Conclusion and next steps

1. Technocrats, ideas and interests

Independent, science-based technocrats?

Two long-term trends may push central bankers closer to a technocratic ideal:

Not so independent

Yet de jure independence is not de facto insulation:

Independence does not suppress politician pressures, nor removes politics entirely

Science with caveats

Externally: reputation management

Internally: individual preferences

The way central bankers read and narrate the causes of inflation may therefore not only be driven by economic fundamentals, but also by external and internal politics

2. Data & method

Data sources

Public speeches (1970–2023)

  • Campiglio et al. (2025) + FRASER archives
  • 8,253 speeches, long single-speaker texts (~3,100 words)
  • 1.1M sentences, 24M words

Private deliberations (1976–2019)

  • All FOMC meetings scraped from the Fed website
  • 477 verbatim transcripts, 123,039 interventions
  • 0.5M sentences, 12M words

Inflation causal claims

Our goal: detect, categorize, and track what factors central bankers blame for inflation in their private deliberations and public speeches.


However, central bank talk creates to identification challenges:

  • Causal relationships can be implicit
  • Theories are applied, not named

“On the inflation number […] one of the major factors is the effect of the structural deficit plus the projected decline of the dollar.”

Robert Forrestal, FOMC meeting, 1984


“Demand for workers far exceeds the supply of available workers, and nominal wages have been growing at a pace well above what would be consistent with 2 percent inflation.”

Jerome Powell, speech, 2022

Detecting inflation drivers

Legacy options fall short

  • Manual coding: prohibitive for 60,000+ paragraphs, hard to keep consistent
  • Dictionaries, topic models: scale well, but are poor measures of causal claims
    • Co-occurence of inflation and labor in a sentence may not be causal (or causality could be reverse)
    • Counting mentions of the “NAIRU” or the “Phillips curve” will miss most of it (Levingston, 2021; Meade & Thornton, 2012).

We opt for a Large Language Models (LLMs) classification pipeline:

Not a magical solution:

  • Prompt-sensitive and stochastic nature -> measurement bias and reproducibility issues (Cova, 2025)

Five steps

  1. With a broad dictionary of inflation related keywords, extract all the relevant paragraphs

60,147 inflation paragraphs

FOMC meetings public speeches
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020

Five steps

  1. With a broad dictionary of inflation related keywords, extract all the relevant paragraphs
  1. Build a codebook from 300 hand-coded excerpts

Codebook

Explicit and implicit claims, upward and downward pressures
Driver Captures
Labor wage-price spirals, employment, unions
Market power pricing, competition, profits
Fiscal spending, deficits
Energy oil, gas, electricity
Commodities food, raw materials
Exchange rate dollar strength / weakness

Five steps

  1. With a broad dictionary of inflation related keywords, extract all the relevant paragraphs
  1. Build a codebook from 300 hand-coded excerpts
  1. Hand-code a validation sample of 800 excerpts (3 coders)

Inter-coder agreement

α = 0.84
Krippendorff’s α, mean across categories
Market power.91
Commodities.90
Energy.88
Exchange rate.86
Labor.81
Fiscal.77

Five steps

  1. With a broad dictionary of inflation related keywords, extract all the relevant paragraphs
  1. Build a codebook from 300 hand-coded excerpts
  1. Hand-code a validation sample of 800 excerpts (3 coders)
  1. Benchmark 12 LLMs against the human gold standard

12 LLMs vs the human gold standard

Macro-averaged F1 across the six drivers
o30.83
o4-mini0.81
o3-mini0.79
Llama 405B0.76
GPT-4o0.73
Llama 70B0.69
Claude 3.5 Sonnet0.69
DeepSeek V30.68
GPT-4o mini0.67
Gemma 2 9B0.65
Mixtral 8x7B0.45
Llama 8B0.42

Five steps

  1. With a broad dictionary of inflation related keywords, extract all the relevant paragraphs
  1. Build a codebook from 300 hand-coded excerpts
  1. Hand-code a validation sample of 800 excerpts (3 coders)
  1. Benchmark 12 LLMs against the human gold standard
  1. Run the best cost-effective model (o4-mini) on the full corpus

12 LLMs vs the human gold standard

Macro-averaged F1 across the six drivers
o30.83
o4-mini0.81
o3-mini0.79
Llama 405B0.76
GPT-4o0.73
Llama 70B0.69
Claude 3.5 Sonnet0.69
DeepSeek V30.68
GPT-4o mini0.67
Gemma 2 9B0.65
Mixtral 8x7B0.45
Llama 8B0.42

3. Descriptive results

Inflation drivers’ weight

Over the whole corpus:

  • Labor is the most frequent explanation, closely followed by Energy
  • Fiscal, Commodities and Exchange rate come about half as often
  • Market power (competition, margins and profits) is by far the least discussed

Inflation drivers over time

Inflation drivers in private and in public

Yearly shares among the six drivers (points), loess smoothing with 90% confidence bands. FOMC transcripts 1976–2019, speeches 1970–2023.

Inflation drivers in private and in public

Public speeches and private deliberations systematically favor different explanations:

  • Fiscal blame is much higher in public (21% of claims vs 7% at the FOMC, 39 years out of 44)
  • Labor and Market power are higher in private (Labor 35% vs 26%, Market power 9% vs 6%)

This is consistent with a reputation management strategy (Diessner, 2023; Moschella, 2024)

  • In public, shift the blame onto government deficits: a blame avoidance / performative strategy
  • In private, talk about the distributive conflict over wages and profits, but avoid voicing it (Semieniuk et al., 2025; Weber & Wasner, 2023)
    • The labor gap anticipates Paper 2: a fear of full employment that is hidden from the public

Inflation drivers and individual characteristics

PhD economists vs others

  • PhD economists account for 62% of inflation paragraphs
  • They blame labor more and fiscal policy less
    • Part of the fiscal gap could simply be contextual: non-economists dominate the 1970s, when fiscal explanations peak

PhD economist: terminal degree is a PhD in economics or finance. Shares among the six drivers.

Inflation drivers and individual characteristics

Does the PhD school matter?

  • For most drivers, there are no significant differences between economists depending on their training
  • Freshwater PhDs talk a bit more about fiscal policy, saltwater PhDs about the exchange rate
    • But only few Freshwater PhDs

PhD economists only.

  • Freshwater: Chicago, Carnegie Mellon, Wisconsin, Johns Hopkins, UCLA, Northwestern…
  • Saltwater: Harvard, MIT, Yale, Princeton, Penn, Berkeley, Michigan…

4. Fear of full employment

Why focus on labor?

First, it is the most prominent driver of inflation in Fed discourse

It clashes with the Fed’s dual mandate: full employment becomes a threat to price stability

It rests on central but contested theories: the Phillips curve and the NAIRU


→ Given these features, can we explain the variation in Labor blaming?

A baseless fear of full employment

First, let’s look at economic fundamentals:

  1. Phillips curve / NAIRU inspired thinking sticks despite growing criticism (Arbogast et al., 2023; Tarullo, 2017)

    • Fed officials blame labor more when unemployment falls, and increasingly so near the NAIRU
  1. This “fear of full employment” is baseless, since the Phillips curve is dead (Galbraith et al., 2007; Ratner & Sim, 2022)

    • Fed officials react to unemployment irrespective of the actual wage growth

Formally (negative binomial, quarterly)

\[ \begin{aligned} \log E[\text{Labor}_t] = {\color{#8f8880}{\beta_0}} &+ {\color{#7b3fa0}{\beta_1 U_{t-1} + \beta_2 U^2_{t-1}}} + {\color{#00a88f}{\Omega W_{t-1}}} \\ &+ {\color{#8f8880}{\Gamma Z_{t-1}}} + {\color{#8f8880}{\beta_3 N_t + \alpha_c}} \end{aligned} \]

  • \(U_{t-1}\): unemployment (BLS), lagged one quarter, centred
  • \(W_{t-1}\): wage growth (nominal or real)
  • \(Z_{t-1}\): other macro controls (inflation, GDP growth), added gradually
  • \(N_t\), \(\alpha_c\): log word count, Fed Chair dummies

The Fed reacts to unemployment

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unemployment −0.200***
(0.042)
−0.200***
(0.045)
−0.183***
(0.046)
−0.192***
(0.043)
−0.183***
(0.040)
Unemployment² 0.060***
(0.014)
0.060***
(0.014)
0.059***
(0.014)
0.058***
(0.015)
0.055***
(0.014)
Nominal wage growth 0.034
(0.038)
Real wage growth 0.021
(0.035)
0.027
(0.034)
Inflation 0.006
(0.023)
0.024
(0.031)
0.037
(0.032)
Real GDP growth 0.032
(0.024)
Word count (log) 0.542**
(0.180)
0.546**
(0.182)
0.545**
(0.182)
0.543**
(0.185)
0.556**
(0.176)
Observations 167 167 167 167 167
Chair dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Negative binomial, Newey-West standard errors. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust to Tealbook forecasts, the CBO unemployment gap, Poisson / quasi-Poisson models.

But not to wages !

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unemployment −0.200***
(0.042)
−0.200***
(0.045)
−0.183***
(0.046)
−0.192***
(0.043)
−0.183***
(0.040)
Unemployment² 0.060***
(0.014)
0.060***
(0.014)
0.059***
(0.014)
0.058***
(0.015)
0.055***
(0.014)
Nominal wage growth 0.034
(0.038)
Real wage growth 0.021
(0.035)
0.027
(0.034)
Inflation 0.006
(0.023)
0.024
(0.031)
0.037
(0.032)
Real GDP growth 0.032
(0.024)
Word count (log) 0.542**
(0.180)
0.546**
(0.182)
0.545**
(0.182)
0.543**
(0.185)
0.556**
(0.176)
Observations 167 167 167 167 167
Chair dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Wage growth: Average Hourly Earnings (AHE, BLS). Negative binomial, Newey-West standard errors. Same with median weekly earnings → appendix

Is this fear genuine?

Then, let’s compare public and private settings:

  • Blaming workers sits badly with the maximum employment mandate: a reputational cost in public (Best, 2020; Moschella, 2024)

  • We expect it reactions to unemployment to be stronger in private FOMC deliberations than in public speeches

\[ \begin{aligned} \log E[\text{Labor}_{ft}] = {\color{#8f8880}{\beta_0}} &+ {\color{#8f8880}{\beta_1 U_{t-1} + \beta_2 U^2_{t-1} + \beta_3 FOMC_f}} \\ &+ {\color{#9e2f27}{\beta_4 (U_{t-1} \times FOMC_f)}} \\ &+ {\color{#9e2f27}{\beta_5 (U^2_{t-1} \times FOMC_f)}} \\ &+ {\color{#8f8880}{\Omega W_{t-1} + \Gamma Z_{t-1} + \beta_6 N_{ft} + \alpha_c}} \end{aligned} \]

  • \(FOMC_f\): 1 for FOMC meetings, 0 for public speeches
  • \(U_{t-1} \times FOMC_f\): does the reaction to unemployment differ in private?
  • \(W\), \(Z\), \(N\), \(\alpha_c\): as before (wages, macro controls, forum-specific log words, Chair dummies)

A fear largely hidden in public

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unemployment −0.124**
(0.048)
−0.124*
(0.049)
−0.110*
(0.052)
−0.119*
(0.049)
−0.107*
(0.047)
Unemployment² 0.059**
(0.019)
0.060**
(0.019)
0.059**
(0.019)
0.058**
(0.019)
0.055**
(0.018)
FOMC 0.193
(0.187)
0.195
(0.187)
0.204
(0.183)
0.197
(0.185)
0.178
(0.190)
Unemp × FOMC −0.162**
(0.057)
−0.162**
(0.057)
−0.159**
(0.055)
−0.161**
(0.056)
−0.167**
(0.057)
Unemp² × FOMC −0.001
(0.032)
−0.001
(0.032)
−0.002
(0.032)
−0.001
(0.032)
−0.001
(0.032)
Nominal wage growth 0.032
(0.033)
Real wage growth 0.015
(0.031)
0.021
(0.030)
Inflation 0.005
(0.021)
0.018
(0.027)
0.029
(0.027)
Real GDP growth 0.032
(0.022)
Observations 334 334 334 334 334
Chair dummies, log words ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Negative binomial panel, Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. Robust to speaker composition (Board vs regional presidents) and to the 1993 transparency shock.

Is this fear partisan?

Finally, do electoral politics matter?

Controlling for economic fundamentals, is labor blaming higher under Democrats?

\[ \begin{aligned} &\log E[\text{Labor}_{ft}] = \\ &\quad {\color{#8f8880}{\beta_0}} + {\color{#8f8880}{\beta_1 U_{t-1} + \beta_2 U^2_{t-1}}} \\ &\quad + {\color{#8f8880}{\beta_3 FOMC_f + \beta_4 (U_{t-1} \times FOMC_f)}} \\ &\quad + {\color{#0b3d91}{\gamma_1 Pres_t}} + {\color{#2b6bd6}{\gamma_2 (Pres_t \times FOMC_f)}} \\ &\quad + {\color{#6a9be8}{\gamma_3 (Pres_t \times U_{t-1}) + \gamma_4 (Pres_t \times U_{t-1} \times FOMC_f)}} \\ &\quad + {\color{#8f8880}{\Omega W_{t-1} + \Gamma Z_{t-1} + \beta_6 N_{ft} + \alpha_c}} \end{aligned} \]

  • Base effect: is labor blamed more under Democrats?
  • × Forum: is this partisan gap concentrated in private?
  • × Forum × Unemployment: does it sharpen as unemployment falls?
  • \(W\), \(Z\), \(N\), \(\alpha_c\): real wage growth; inflation, real GDP growth; forum log words; Chair dummies

A fear stronger under Democrats

(1) (2) (3)
Unemployment −0.137**
(0.049)
−0.135**
(0.045)
−0.049
(0.098)
Unemployment² 0.054**
(0.021)
0.053**
(0.018)
0.061*
(0.026)
FOMC 0.139
(0.186)
−0.111
(0.207)
−0.087
(0.216)
Unemp × FOMC −0.173**
(0.057)
−0.198***
(0.057)
−0.311**
(0.095)
President (Dem) 0.407***
(0.117)
0.160
(0.114)
0.224
(0.165)
Pres × FOMC 0.495**
(0.190)
0.424
(0.270)
Pres × Unemp −0.157
(0.120)
Pres × Unemp × FOMC 0.229*
(0.116)
Observations 334 334 334
Macro controls, Chair dummies, log words ✓ ✓ ✓

Negative binomial panel, Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. Macro controls in all models: real wage growth, inflation, real GDP growth. Partisan terms jointly significant (Wald, p < 0.001 in model 2). Not explained by labor policy, Congress or the fiscal stance → appendix

Summing up

  1. The Phillips curve and the NAIRU are still there: labor blame rises as unemployment falls, and accelerates near the NAIRU, over 1978–2019

  2. Likely deeply embedded: the fear persists without any wage growth, and labor claims do not anticipate future wage growth either → forward-looking wages

    “Many good monetary policymakers […] have an almost instinctual attachment to some of those problematic concepts.” — Tarullo (2017)

  3. But hidden from the public: strongest in FOMC deliberations, muted in speeches

  4. And politically biased: stronger under Democratic presidents, not explained by labor laws → labor policy

Conclusion

Summary and avenues

Interests and prices

  1. LLMs + archives make inflation diagnoses measurable over fifty years
  2. Narratives shift with the context, but labor dominates and profits are absent
  3. Public and private diagnoses diverge: fiscal in public, labor and market power in private

What’s next? - Exploring individual variation?

Fear of full employment

  1. The Phillips curve and NAIRU are still alive and well in central bankers’ minds,
  2. Lower and flatter tendancy to blame labor in public suggests reputation management
  3. The partisan bias of the Fed may run through diagnosis rather than intent

What’s next? - Digesting AJPS rejection and resubmission

Thank you!

jerome.deyris@sciencespo.fr

Appendix

Inflation keywords

inflation cpi pce
price increas price stab overall price
price level consumer price producer price
price index price pressure price shock
higher price raise price raising price
rising price

“Enhanced” triplets

Legacy triplets

Our method

Inflation discussions

  1. Identify 129,457 inflation-related sentences
    • A sentence is flagged if it contains an inflation or price-related word (keywords)
  2. Build 60,150 inflation paragraphs
    • (Semi-)consecutive inflation sentences are merged, and the preceding and following sentences are added (triplets)

Building the codebook

Develop a codebook

  • 300 excerpts coded by all three authors
    • get a first sense of inflation paragraphs
    • identify the most frequent drivers

Validation sample

  • 800 excerpts coded by all three authors
    • inter-coder reliability
    • human benchmark (“gold standard”)

Test LLMs

  • 12 models compared to the human benchmark
    • same prompt, same excerpts
    • selection on F1, precision and recall

Example 1: Energy and Commodities

“In recent months, turmoil in North Africa and the Middle East has reduced the global supply of oil and likely added a substantial risk premium to the price of a barrel of crude as well. What do these fast-rising commodity prices mean for inflation for the rest of the year and beyond? I believe that the inflation rate will reach a peak around the middle of this year and then edge back downward. […] First, commodity prices are not likely to keep increasing indefinitely at a rapid rate.” (Williams, speech, 4 May 2011)

Code(s): Energy, Commodities

Example 2: Fiscal and Exchange rate

“As I look at these projections, Mr. Chairman, I think that the risk is probably on the up side in terms of higher inflation and growth than projected. […] The only point of departure I have is on the inflation number, which I think will be higher. Some of the reasons have already been stated, so I’ll skip over those but one of the major factors is the effect of the structural deficit plus the projected decline of the dollar.” (Forrestal, FOMC, 30 January 1984)

Code(s): Fiscal, Exchange rate

Example 3: Market Power

“Many manufacturers are continuing to implement staff reduction plans, and I just don’t sense any fundamental improvement in the underlying employment conditions. Inflation continues to look constructive. Intensive competitive conditions seem to be an absolute lid on significant price increases. The people I talk to say the pricing environment for all products is really very tough.” (Keehn, FOMC, 30 June 1992)

Code(s): Market Power

Example 4: Labor and Other

“[…] Despite moderate decreases in PPI and CPI inflation so far in 1997, there is a heightened concern about an inflationary impulse emanating from observed price increases, a tight labor market, and a continuing easy credit market. In addition, we have seen anecdotal evidence […] with respect to the apparently shifting pattern of health care cost increases from a declining to a rising trend that will no longer tend to offset at least a portion of the wage increases.” (Melzer, FOMC, 25 March 1997)

Code(s): Labor, Other (credit, health care)

Example 5: No inflation driver

“I see job creation eventually falling to about 100,000 a month by the end of 2019. Just as I think we need to put monthly fluctuations in inflation data in perspective, I think we need to put job growth in context. In the very near future, we’re not going to need to create jobs at the intense pace we’ve been experiencing over the past few years.” (Harker, speech, 1 June 2017)

Code(s): None

Prompt

We are exploring central bank communication by looking at central banker policy deliberations. We want to understand how they discuss the causes of inflation. Please read the excerpt, and classify it using the following labels:

  • “None” if the excerpt does not discuss inflation, or describes inflation without any reference to its causes.
  • “Labor” if the excerpt states that wages, workers’ demands, or other developments in labor markets cause inflation.
  • “Market power” if the excerpt states that business’ price-setting behaviour, profits, markups or competition dynamics cause inflation.
  • “Fiscal” if the excerpt states that government spending, deficit, public expenses, taxes, and other fiscal or budgetary considerations cause inflation.
  • “Energy” if the excerpt states that changes in the price or supply of energy cause inflation.
  • “Commodities” if the excerpt states that changes in the price of non-energy commodities (food, agriculture, raw materials, etc.) cause inflation.

Prompt (continued)

  • “Exchange rate” if the excerpt states that the value of the dollar against other currencies causes inflation.
  • “Other” if the excerpt discusses other causes of inflation not captured by the previous categories (supply chain bottlenecks, regulations, productivity, credit dynamics, shelter, healthcare costs, etc.).

You can give excerpts multiple labels (for example, “Market power, Fiscal”). IF the excerpt has the label “None”, it should have no other labels.

Reply ONLY with the assigned label(s) (for example, “Labor, Other”). DO NOT EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER. This is the excerpt:

Validation sample

Develop a codebook

  • 300 excerpts coded by all three authors

Validation sample

  • 800 excerpts coded by all three authors
  • inter-coder reliability (Krippendorff’s α)
  • human benchmark (“gold standard”)

Model selection

Final model run

  • We select o4-mini, which performs best, with good (but heterogeneous) F1 scores
  • The full corpus is sent to OpenAI’s API, one excerpt at a time
  • We obtain time series of causal claims about inflation (1970–2023)

Wage growth: median weekly earnings

(1) (2) (3)
Unemployment −0.206***
(0.043)
−0.206***
(0.044)
−0.197***
(0.041)
Unemployment² 0.061***
(0.014)
0.062***
(0.014)
0.059***
(0.013)
Nominal wage growth (MWE) −0.007
(0.010)
Real wage growth (MWE) −0.009
(0.009)
−0.005
(0.010)
Inflation 0.001
(0.026)
0.012
(0.025)
Real GDP growth 0.037
(0.029)
Word count (log) 0.511**
(0.185)
0.519**
(0.184)
0.520**
(0.173)
Observations 162 162 162
Chair dummies ✓ ✓ ✓

With Median Weekly Earnings, wage growth is again never significant, and even slightly negative

MWE (BLS) available from 1979. Negative binomial, Newey-West standard errors.

Labor policy and the partisan fear

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemp × FOMC −0.190**
(0.059)
−0.194**
(0.060)
−0.193**
(0.060)
−0.195**
(0.061)
−0.318***
(0.095)
−0.326***
(0.098)
President (Dem) 0.108
(0.111)
0.085
(0.101)
0.205
(0.112)
0.164
(0.105)
0.120
(0.155)
0.136
(0.149)
Pres × FOMC 0.604***
(0.171)
0.611***
(0.176)
0.609***
(0.174)
0.612***
(0.177)
0.639**
(0.224)
0.658**
(0.232)
Pres × Unemp −0.172
(0.121)
−0.255*
(0.121)
Pres × Unemp × FOMC 0.276*
(0.114)
0.283*
(0.118)
Quarters since min. wage hike 0.009
(0.005)
0.007
(0.005)
0.009
(0.006)
Δ Workers per WHD investigator 0.001
(0.007)
−0.001
(0.007)
−0.002
(0.008)
Observations 320 320 320 320 320 320
Macro controls, Chair dummies, log words ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Labor policy proxies (federal minimum wage, Wage and Hour Division enforcement) are never significant, and the partisan terms keep their size and significance

Do labor claims anticipate wage growth?

(t+1) (t+2) (t+3) (t+4)
Labor talk (log) 0.096
(0.131)
0.186
(0.142)
0.198
(0.193)
0.112
(0.199)
Unemployment −0.132**
(0.041)
−0.152**
(0.048)
−0.170**
(0.064)
−0.237**
(0.089)
Inflation 0.161**
(0.054)
0.172**
(0.060)
0.177
(0.110)
0.178
(0.129)
Wage growth (t) 0.585***
(0.087)
0.540***
(0.069)
0.477***
(0.083)
0.359***
(0.085)
R² 0.796 0.789 0.743 0.680
Observations 166 165 164 163
Chair dummies, log words ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

If the Fed were acting prospectively, labor claims today should predict wage growth tomorrow: they do not, at any horizon up to a year

Robustness tests

Estimation

  • Other count models (Poisson, pseudo-Poisson)
  • Alternative forecasts (Tealbook)
  • Unemployment gap (UGAP) using CBO’s NAIRU estimates
  • 15-year rolling-window regressions

Sample and context

  • Dummy for the 1993 transparency shock
  • Leave-one-out, excluding one presidential administration at a time
  • Subgroup regressions for different speaker distributions in public / private

References

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